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Introduction
Hayek (1945) argues convincingly that the true merit of the capitalist market economy is its capability of continually responding to the ongoing changes in needs and possibilities by reallocating resources towards their best use. 1 Prices convey information about productivity and scarcity of resources, and owners of resources react on price signals to obtain the highest possible returns, thereby collectively acting as an e¤ective allocation device. According to this view, taxation distorts the functioning of the market economy by creating a wedge between the private return and the social return to a reallocation of resources, leaving socially desirable opportunities unexploited as a result. This type of tax distortion should be relevant for the labor market since employees change jobs many times during their career and economic incentives are a key determinant behind job changing decisions (Topel and Ward, 1992 ).
This paper studies the impact of taxation on the mobility and allocation of labor, and quanti…es the e¢ ciency loss from misallocation of labor caused by taxation. 2 As will be explained below, labor mobility responses are fundamentally di¤erent from the hours-of-work responses of the basic labor supply model, which underlies the modern reduced-form empirical identi…cation methods to measure behavioral responses to taxation. These methods are not well suited to detect mobility behavior, and therefore we apply a structural approach. Our analysis builds on a standard search theoretic framework, along the lines of Burdett (1978) and Christensen et al. (2005) , where workers continually seek better paid jobs, but are also …red from time to time because of economic development and productivity shocks. We incorporate non-linear taxation into this setting and estimate the structural parameters of the model using employer-employee register based data for the full Danish population of workers and workplaces for the years 2004-2006. The estimated model is then used to examine the impact of di¤erent changes in the tax system, thereby characterizing the distortionary e¤ects of taxation on the allocation of labor.
The overall tax distortion is identi…ed by an experiment where all taxation along the intensive margin is replaced by lump sum taxation. For Denmark, with marginal tax rates ranging from 59 to 72 percent, the result is an increase in aggregate labor income of 1/4, and an e¢ ciency gain equal to 12 percent of initial income. This is a sizable, although not huge, e¢ ciency loss, which should be balanced against the (non-measured) gains in social welfare from social insurance and equality achieved through high marginal taxation. Interestingly, it is possible to reap a very large part of the potential e¢ ciency gain by going "half the way"and replace the current taxation 1 The seminal article by Hayek was selected in 2011 to be one of the twenty most in ‡uential articles published by the American Economic Review in the entire history of the review. 2 Our focus is on measuring behavioral responses to taxation and quantifying the e¢ ciency loss from taxation. This is in line with the literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income. We do not attempt to quantify the trade-o¤ between equality and e¢ ciency (see Immervoll et al, 2007) , but a normative tax analysis should, of course, balance the e¢ ciency loss from taxation against the distributional consequences.
1 with a ‡at tax rate of 30 percent on all income. This shift from a Scandinavian tax system with high marginal tax rates to a level of taxation in line with low-tax OECD countries such as the United States increases total income by 20 percent and yields an e¢ ciency gain measured in proportion to initial income of 10 percent. The large e¤ect on economic e¢ ciency from going only "half the way" re ‡ects the well-known result in the economics of taxation that the marginal e¢ ciency loss is growing in the level of taxation. The structural approach enables us to derive this relationship between the marginal e¢ ciency loss and the level of taxation, which turns out to be strongly convex with a La¤er rate around 2/3. Finally, and most importantly, we compute the marginal tax distortion at the initial tax system and the elasticity of taxable income by looking at a small reduction in all marginal tax rates. 3 The marginal e¢ ciency e¤ect is in this case equal to 87 percent of the (mechanical) loss in tax revenue, 4 which translates into an elasticity of labor market income (taxable income) with respect to the net-of-tax rate of 0.3. A number of sensitivity tests suggest that the estimate of the elasticity of taxable income due to mobility responses lies in the interval 0.15 to 0.35.
Our results are related to the large public …nance literature, recently surveyed by Saez et al.
(2012), estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate using tax return data. The ultimate goal of this literature is to estimate the 'true' underlying structural elasticity relevant for quantifying the e¢ ciency losses from taxation. In two in ‡uential papers, Feldstein (1995 Feldstein ( , 1999 argued that the e¤ects of the tax system on the reported income of the tax payers capture all relevant e¢ ciency losses, and therefore the elasticity of taxable income is a su¢ cient statistic to compute the total tax distortion. However, the inclusion of taxable income responses due to tax avoidance and evasion behavior relies on strong assumptions (Chetty, 2009; Slemrod and Kopczuk, 2002) , and recent empirical studies have increasingly focused on more narrow income concepts, mainly labor income as we also do, in order to isolate real responses (e.g.
Chetty et al., 2011a; Kleven and Schultz, 2013).
Most of the literature has exploited variation in tax rates generated by tax reforms to identify the elasticity using di¤erence-in-di¤erence type methodologies where individual post-reform income levels are compared to pre-reform levels. Saez et al. (2012) conclude that an elasticity of taxable income of 0.25 seems to be a reasonable estimate from the existing studies and the recent empirical evidence for Denmark in Kleven and Schultz (2013) , based on a series of tax reforms and a very rich administrative data set covering the entire Danish population, points to an elasticity of labor income around 0.1.
Other recent studies have exploited bunching at the kink points of the tax system to identify the elasticity of taxable income (Saez, 2010 Both the di¤erence-in-di¤erence type methods and the bunching method are unlikely to identify the labor allocation e¤ects of taxation studied here. To see why, consider a change of the tax system where …rst all marginal tax rates are identical and then the marginal tax rates for income levels above a certain threshold are raised to a new, higher level, thus introducing tax progressivity with a kink-point in the tax schedule. According to a standard, hours-of-work labor supply model with heterogeneity in abilities, the behavior of workers with income below the threshold will be una¤ected, while all workers with income above the threshold will reduce labor supply and income.
Hence, it is possible to separate workers into distinct control and treatment groups depending on income levels before the tax change, and the tax increase makes workers pile up at the income level of the kink-point, thereby creating a discontinuity in the density function. This makes it possible to identify the underlying structural labor supply elasticity by measuring changes in income of the treatment group relative to the control group or by exploiting the bunching of individuals at the kink-point. In the search framework, both workers with income above the threshold and below it will reduce search e¤ort. The reason that also workers below the threshold reduce e¤ort is that their expected after-tax income gain from searching and climbing up the income ladder is reduced.
Therefore, they do not constitute a well-de…ned control group and the kink in the tax schedule does not create an excess mass of individuals at the income threshold.
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To conclude, the otherwise strong empirical identi…cation strategies normally used to identify income responses to taxation and the elasticity of taxable income are not well-suited to detect the income responses due to job mobility e¤ects, and our estimates of the elasticity of taxable income and of the tax distortions of labor allocation, based on a structural approach, indicate that these job mobility e¤ects are of a substantial magnitude. 5 Another reason why the di¤erence-in-di¤erence types techniques are unlikely to detect the e¤ects on search behavior is that job shifts and reallocation of labor are time-consuming processes, implying that it takes relatively long time for the economy to reach its new long run distribution of earnings after a tax reform.
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A few studies have analyzed the impact of taxation on job mobility decisions by looking at the mobility of people across states (Feldstein and Wrobel, 1998 ) and across countries (Kleven et al., 2014) . The second study examines the impact of changes in the preferential tax regime for foreign researchers and high-income foreigners in Denmark and …nds large e¤ects on the number of highly paid foreigners. These types of studies are not comparable to our analysis of the impact of taxes on worker mobility and job allocation within a country, but they do show that taxation is important for the decision to shift job, as also found in our analysis. 6 A study by Gentry and Hubbard (2004) looks at the impact of taxes on within-country job mobility. They show, using a reduced-form empirical analysis of the relationship between job turnover and tax rates in the US (together with a number of other co-variates), that job shifting is negatively correlated with tax rates and tax progression.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives the relationship between taxation and the long run allocation of labor in a search theoretic model. Section 3 describes the estimation of the model. Section 4 uses the estimated model to quantify the distortions of taxation on the allocation of labor and derives the mobility-based elasticity of taxable income. Sensitivity analyses are reported in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
Theory
In this section we set up a model of job search, labor allocation and taxation. It is an on-the-job search model similar to Burdett (1978) and Christensen et al. (2005) , but with discrete wage distribution, zero discounting and including non-linear taxation. The assumption of a discrete wage distribution gives a direct correspondence between the theoretical model and the empirical implementation. The assumption of no discounting simpli…es our analysis of tax reforms considerably since we only need to consider the in ‡uence of a reform on the long run, steady state outcome to determine its implications on aggregate welfare/economic e¢ ciency.
Fundamentals of the model
We consider a worker who is either employed in one out of a number of potential employment relationships/jobs (i = 1; :::N ) paying di¤erent wages, or without any job (i = 0). When employed the worker may lose his job due to exogenous, random job destruction shocks. The worker may engage in search activity to …nd a better paid job when employed, and to …nd an employment opportunity when not employed. Thus, search leads to job mobility and labor reallocation. 6 Note that the cross-country mobility decisions are related to the variation in average tax rates across countries, implying that a replacement of taxes that are increasing in income with a poll tax does not remove tax distortions in cross-country mobility decisions.
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In job i, the worker earns income w i , where w 1 < < w N . In the non-employment state, i = 0, the worker obtains an income equivalent w 0 of leisure and home production. The net-of-tax income in job i equals w i T i , where T i is a tax-bene…t function that includes all taxes and transfers, and T 0 is the net bene…t in the non-employement state. We de…ne marginal tax rates as m i = (T i+1 T i ) = (w i+1 w i ) for i = 1; :::; N 1, and m 0 = (T 1 T 0 ) =w 1 , where it is assumed that 0 m i < 1 for all i. We disregard low-wage job o¤ers that would never be accepted by the worker and assume w 1 T 1 w 0 T 0 .
In state i, the worker decides on a search e¤ort level s i 0. given discrete probability distribution with probability p h of w h for h = 1; :::; N . The cumulative distribution is P i = P i j=1 p j . The worker may either accept the job o¤er and shift to job j, or reject the o¤er and stay in state i. Since the e¤ort cost function c (s) and the job o¤er distribution P are independent of the initial state i, it follows that a worker will accept a job o¤er if w j w i .
A worker who does not receive a job o¤er stays at state i.
When employed, the worker is exposed to a job destruction shock representing changing economic circumstances. At the Poisson frequency , the worker loses his current job, becomes non-employed and must wait for new job o¤ers. The total job separation rate from job i is then
If non-employed, the worker receives job o¤ers drawn from the P -distribution with Poisson frequency s 0 , and accepts any job o¤er w j because of the assumption w j T j w 0
The income net of taxes and search cost in state i equals w i T i c(s i ), and the worker decides on search e¤ort in all states to maximize intertemporal utility de…ned as the expected present value of income net of taxes and search costs.
Optimal search behavior
A given search behavior, s 0 ; s 1 ; :::; s N , results in a certain steady state distribution over states i = 0; 1; :::; N , determining the share of time the worker will be non-employed, i = 0, and in jobs i = 1; :::; N , respectively, in the long run. With many identical workers this steady state distribution would also be the long run distribution of workers over states at any given time. Let u be the steady state rate of non-employment, and let g i be the steady state fraction of employment in job i = 1; :::; N , where P N j=1 g i = 1. The cumulative distribution is G i = P i j=1 g i . The assumption of no discounting implies that the intertemporal utility W of the worker equals the expectation of income net of tax and search cost with respect to the steady state distribution of employment and wages:
The worker maximizes W with respect to s 0 ; :::; s N . The …rst-order conditions are
To …nd the partial derivatives @u=@s 0 and @g j =@s i , we must determine how the steady state distribution depends on behavior. The ‡ow out of non-employment equals u s 0 , and the ‡ow into non-employment is (1 u) . In steady state these ‡ows are identical giving
Consider the set of jobs I = f1; :::; ig. According to the steady state distribution, the worker will spend the fraction (1 u) G i of time in set I. The ‡ow into I comes from non-employment and equals u s 0 P i . The ‡ow out of I to non-employment is (1 u) G i , and the ‡ow to higher wages
The condition that ‡ow out equals ‡ow in is
which together with equation (4) gives
showing that G stochastically dominates P because search on-the-job implies that the worker climbs up the income ladder. Note also that an increase in s i implies that the post-change distribution stochastically dominates the pre-change distribution.
From the …rst-order conditions (2) and (3) and the relationships (4) and (5) characterizing the steady state distribution, we may derive the following formulas for the optimal search behavior (Appendix A)
and
6 for i = 0; 1; :::; N 1. This gives a recursive determination of optimal e¤ort levels. Given s N = 0, equation (7) implicitly yields a solution for s N 1 , and given this s N 1 , it gives a solution for s N 2 and so on.
E¤ects of tax reforms on search behavior, labor allocation and economic e¢ ciency
To illustrate how taxes work in this setting, we now consider small tax reforms formalized as in…nitesimal changes in the tax liabilities, dT i , for all i = 0; :::N . It is seen directly from equation (7) that search behavior only depends on taxation through T i+1 T i , and therefore only on the marginal tax rates since
From s N = 0 follows ds N = 0. To obtain the e¤ects on search e¤ort levels for i = 0; 1; :::; N 1, we di¤erentiate equation (7). This gives
Inspection of equation (8) shows that if the marginal tax rate is increased at income level w j for some j N 1, and unchanged everywhere else, then search e¤ort at all wage levels up to and including j decreases, while e¤ort is unchanged at higher income levels, and the worker's expected (pre tax) income decreases accordingly. This is in contrast to a standard hours-of-work, labor supply model, where the worker's behavior and hence income is only a¤ected if the worker happens to have a pre-change income level exactly where the marginal tax rate is changed.
In order to understand the empirical challenges of identifying the behavioral responses to taxation in a setting with search and labor mobility, consider a change of the tax system where …rst all marginal tax rates are identical, and then the marginal tax rates for income levels above a certain threshold are raised to a new, higher value, thus introducing tax progression with a kinkpoint in the tax schedule. In a standard hours-of-work, labor supply model, all workers with income below the kink-point will keep hours and income unchanged, while all workers with income above it will decrease hours to an extent that will keep income at or above the kink-point. According to such a model, the tax experiment would split workers into a control group of una¤ected (low income) workers and a treatment group of a¤ected (high income) workers, and the post change tax system would make workers pile up at the income level of the kink-point thereby creating a discontinuity in the density function. This implies that it is possible to identify empirically the behavioral responses by comparing treatment and control groups using di¤erence-in-di¤erence type techniques or by exploiting the bunching at the kink-point, as done in the literature surveyed in the Introduction.
In the model studied here, the experiment would a¤ect behavior at all income levels, also below the kink-point. Hence, although the model does create an income distribution with some workers 7 above and some workers below the kink-point, these groups would not constitute a treatment and a control group, respectively. 7 Moreover, there would not be any bunching at the kink-point of the new tax system because search intensities decrease everywhere, and not just above the kink point.
This explains why these two commonly used empirical methods cannot be expected to identify the behavioral e¤ects of taxation on labor mobility and, as a consequence, the tax distortion of the allocation of labor.
Next, we look at the impact of taxation on economic e¢ ciency. The dead-weight loss/excess burden of taxation is de…ned as
where W is the private welfare of equation (1) at the given tax system,W is private welfare in the absence of taxation, and R is the tax revenue de…ned as
where u and g 1 ; :::; g N are the distributional parameters at the given tax system.
In Section 3 and Section 4, we quantify the distortionary e¤ects of taxation by estimating the structural parameters of the model and then compute directly the change in W , R and D caused by di¤erent types of tax reforms. To illustrate the main determinants of the e¢ ciency e¤ects, we …rst analyze theoretically the impact of small reforms.
The change in the dead-weight loss of taxation from a small change in the tax system is equal to (see Appendix B)
where ds i denote the changes in search e¤ort levels induced by the tax change. This result re ‡ects the general insight from the theory of taxation that the e¢ ciency e¤ects of small policy reforms are given simply by the behavioral revenue e¤ects. 8 To see that this is the case, consider a reform that reduces marginal taxes and increases search intensities at all states except N . This will move a probability mass g i j@u=@s 0 j ds 0 from non-employment to job i, which will increase tax revenue by [T i T 0 ] g i j@u=@s 0 j ds 0 . This explains the …rst term on the right hand side of (11) . In the same vein, the increased search e¤ort in job j 2 f1; :::; N 1g will move probability 7 In a homogeneous agent model there could never be a treatment and a control group, but in a heterogeneous agent version of the mobility model, where wage di¤erences were partly due to di¤erences in ability and partly due to di¤erences in the workers' positions in the mobility cycle, the distinction between treatment and control group would still not be clear. For instance, workers with current income (just) below the kink-point could be in that position either due to relatively low ability or due to a temporarily low position in the mobility cycle. In the …rst case they would not be a¤ected by the tax experiment, in the second case they would. 8 This insight applies to any model where individuals optimize and the only source of ine¢ ciency is distortionary taxation (Kleven and Kreiner, 2005) . mass (1 u) j@g i =@s j j ds j from job j to job i where i > j, implying an indirect tax e¤ect of
This explains the second term on the RHS of (11) . All in all, the behavioral e¤ect on tax revenue comes from the way the reform induces people to move from states with lower net taxes to states with higher net taxes.
If the initial tax system is linear, T i = T 0 + m w i for i 1, and we consider a uniform change dm in all marginal tax rates, then the formula (11) simpli…es to (Appendix C)
where
is taxable income (average earned income) and
is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, 1 m. Equation (12) is a standard elasticity formulation of the marginal e¤ect on economic e¢ ciency where in our context " is a 'mobility elasticity': The percentage increase in income caused by intensi…ed search and thereby increased labor mobility for a one percent increase in the net of tax rate.
Empirical implementation
This section …rst describes the institutional features of the Danish labor market and our matched employer-employee data. Next, we outline some identi…cation assumptions, and …nally, the structural estimation approach is described. We follow the approach of Christensen et al. (2005) and estimate directly the wage distribution of job o¤ers, P i , the initial tax-bene…t function, T i , the job o¤er probability parameter, , the mobility e¤ort cost function, c(s), and the job destruction rate, .
The Danish labor market
Unlike many continental European countries, Denmark has a very ‡exible labor market (see, e.g., Botero et al. 2004 ). Employment protection is weak and turnover rates and average tenure are in line with those of the Anglo-Saxon countries. While most workers are in unions, wage formation has increasingly become more ‡exible as wage bargaining has been decentralized from the sector level to the …rm level. In the late 1980s most wage contracts in the private labor market were negotiated at the sector level, but in our base sample year, 2005, less than 20% of the labor market was still covered by centralized wage bargaining. Instead wage contracts are negotiated either exclusively at the …rm level or as a wage ‡oor negotiated at the sector level combined with subsequent negotiations at the …rm level. Dahl et al. (2012) shows that this decentralization process has increased wage dispersion in the Danish labor market such that wages to a larger degree re ‡ect local …rm-level conditions.
Data description and empirical identi…cation assumptions
We use data for the full population of workers and workplaces in , we associate to each worker at a workplace the workplace's average hourly wage rate. This average wage rate then corresponds to the wage w i in job i of the theoretical model. The reason for this approach is that it is the …rm component in wages that matters for job-to-job mobility in on-the-job search models. Under the assumption that worker and …rm components in the wage are independent, …rm-level average wages correspond to the …rm 9 In IDA a workplace is an establishment de…ned by a geographical location. Most often one …rm has only one workplace, but few (larger) …rms have several and thus split up in several workplaces in the data. component plus noise.
In the resulting data set, we have 126,400 workplaces with an average size of 11 employees, an average number of stayers of 7.7, an average wage rate of DKK 197.6, an average number of new hires of 3.3, with 0.6 of these being new hires from non-employment, cf. Table 1 . In the empirical implementation we need data for marginal tax rates. We use the empirical tax Finally, to identify the model, we assume that the mobility cost function is isoelastic:
with the parameters c 0 and .
Structural Estimation
Using the cost function (15), we may rewrite equation (7) determining the optimal search levels as
where =
1+1=
c0 . The levels of search e¤ort determine the job separation rates which, for a …rm paying the wage level w h , equals
where s h is the optimal mobility e¤ort at wage w h . Hence, the probability of x stayers within a year is given by the binomial distribution function
and the probability of observing x 1 ; :::; x H over all …rms is
where d h = + s h (1 P h ) depends directly on and, through s h , on ( ; ; ). The log likelihood equals
The triplet ( ; ; ) is estimated by maximization of ln L ( ; ; ) taking into account the functional relationship from ( ; ; ) to separation rates.
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The resulting parameter estimates of our baseline estimation are displayed in Table 2, while Section 5 reports the outcomes of using alternative speci…cations. 10 The parameter estimates are close to the …ndings of Christensen et al. (2005) . The estimate = 1:268 implies a search cost function that is not far from quadratic. (4) and (5), a rate of non-employment u, and a wage distribution G. The rate of non-employment equals 0.295, which to a large extent re ‡ects the high job destruction rate, .
The rate of non-employment is very high compared to realistic unemployment levels. However, the estimate is more reasonable if including all people of working age who are out of employment temporarily, including those who have left the work force temporarily for various reasons, e.g., parental leave, supplementary education etc. In the sensitivity analysis of Section 5, we consider a modi…cation of the job destruction process that brings the estimated rate of non-employment close to levels compatible with a rate of structural unemployment. See also the discussion in
Christensen et al. (2005).
To evaluate the model's ability to reproduce the empirical wage distribution, we can compare the computed g-distribution with the wage distribution in the data. Figure 3 shows that these distributions are close to each other.
Quantifying the Tax Distortions of the Allocation of Labor
This section uses the estimated model to measure the tax distortions of the allocation of labor. This is done by analyzing the e¤ects of hypothetical tax reforms that change the tax system from one system T with marginal tax rates m i (for example the initial tax system) to another tax system T , involving new marginal tax ratesm i . The changes in the tax liabilities and marginal tax rates are T i =T i T i , and m i =m i m i , respectively, where
Since our focus is on the e¤ects of marginal taxation of the employed on the mobility and allocation of labor, we only consider changes of the marginal tax rates, Given the structural parameters (and P i ), we may compute the optimal Poisson search intensities s i and ŝ i associated with the tax system before and after the reform, respectively, using equation (16) . From these search intensities, it is possible to derive pre-reform and post-reform rates of non-employment, u andû, from equation (4), wage distributions, g andĝ, from equation (5), aggregate income levels, Y andŶ , from equation (13), private welfare levels, W andŴ , from equation (1), where the search costs c(s i ) are computed by inserting c 0 = 1+1= = into equation (15), and tax revenues, R andR from equation (10) . Given this, it is possible to compute the change in aggregate income, Y =Ŷ Y , the change in aggregate welfare/e¢ ciency, (W + R) = D, and the change in the dead-weight loss/excess burden of taxation relative to the mechanical change in government revenue, D= M , where the mechanical change in tax 1 1 This is also an analytical necessity. The condition w 1 T 1 = w 0 T 0 must hold both before and after a reform experiment. Since w 0 is a deep parameter (inferred from observation of w 1 and T 1 T 0 ), a change in m 0 would require a change in w 1 = w 0 =(1 m 0 ). To compute the consequences would require a new domain of the P -distribution (from the new w 1 to w N ), but P and its domain are exogenous in the analysis and can (in principle) only be observed for the existing w 1 . In all the experiments we conduct, T 0 and T 1 , and hence w 1 and m 0 , are kept unchanged from the initial tax system. revenue is the change in government revenue before behavioral responses de…ned as
where u and g i are associated with the pre-reform tax system. For a tax reduction, D= M measures the e¢ ciency gain per dollar of mechanical loss in tax revenue. We then compute the elasticity of taxable income as
The marginal excess burden and the elasticity of taxable income
Y =Y . In our context, this estimate of the elasticity of taxable income measures the percentage increase in the income of the employed due to intensi…ed search and labor mobility for a one percent increase in the net-of-tax rate of all employed. The elasticity estimate we obtain is " = 0:30. We may also use the reform experiment to compute the marginal excess burden of taxation as described above. When measured in proportion to the mechanical loss of tax revenue, we obtain an estimate of 87 percent. A marginal reduction in the tax rates, …nanced by lump sum taxation, yields an e¢ ciency gain equal to 87 cent per dollar. Because we consider a small reform, this estimate also corresponds to the degree of self-…nancing of the tax cut. Thus, the increase in tax revenue from the behavioral response is 87 percent of the mechanical loss in tax revenue. The high marginal excess burden/degree of self …nancing re ‡ects that e¤ective marginal tax rates are high in Denmark (in 2006), 13 and that the estimated elasticity is reasonably high.
The overall impact of marginal taxes on the allocation of labor and economic e¢ ciency
The structural approach enables us to consider tax systems that are not just marginally di¤erent from the existing tax system. In this subsection, we consider alternative tax systemsT First, we consider the e¤ects of eliminating the progressivity of the existing tax system T along the intensive margin. We do this by considering the alternative tax systemT ( m), where m is de…ned such that the mechanical change in tax revenue in equation (18) is zero when replacing the existing tax system T with the new systemT ( m). This gives m 0:6275. The e¤ects of implementing this system in the estimated, structural model are described in the …rst row of Table 3 . It shows that the elimination of progressivity has negligible in ‡uence on non-employment, increases aggregate income by 0.8 percent, and gives an e¢ ciency gain corresponding to 0.5 percent of initial income. These small magnitudes re ‡ect again that the existing tax system is not far from being linear.
Second, we study a reform that completely eliminates marginal taxation along the intensive margin by replacing the existing tax system T withT (0). The results in the third row of Table 3 show that the elimination of marginal taxation lowers non-employment by 13. to the system of a low-tax OECD country according to these estimates. Of course, this should be balanced against the distributional impact of such a reform. Understanding the relationship between the marginal excess burden and the tax rate is key to understanding the relationship between some of our results. implying that the marginal excess burden of raising taxes is rather low at low levels of taxation and rather high at high levels of taxation. Note that the marginal excess burden is approximately equal to the degree of self-…nancing because we are considering small tax reforms, i.e., small changes in m. Thus, the graphs also shows that the La¤er rate (where D= M is equal to one) in the linear tax system is approximately 66 percent.
Robustness
The standard errors of Table 2 are very small and we have not reported con…dence intervals of our further estimations of, e.g., ", but these are very narrow. Still our results could be sensitive to potential mis-speci…cations. In this section we analyze the robustness of our quantitative results for various alternative and relevant speci…cations.
First, as mentioned in Subsection 3.3, the estimated rate of non-employment is rather high, which re ‡ects a high job destruction rate. To account for the possibility that some of the job destruction in the data is not "true" job destruction because of measurement error, we consider the case where there could be a "data job destruction rate" equal to some multiplum, q , of the true job destruction rate, . The observed job separations of the estimation are governed by the "data separation rate"
but the optimal mobility e¤orts entering the estimation are governed by the true destruction rate , which is also involved in the determination of the rate of non-employment via (4). For the parameter q, we consider three values: q = 1, which is the baseline estimation, q = 3, which gives a true job destruction rate in line with other empirical evidence for Denmark by Rosholm and Svarer (2004), 14 and q = 6, which gives a magnitude of the rate of non-employment around the level of the Danish structural unemployment rate, that may be considered as a lower estimate of the long run non-employment rate. For each q considered the full estimation is redone and then the tax experiment with a common one percent increase in the marginal net-of-tax rates along the intensive margin is redone to derive an elasticity of earned income. Table 4 reports our results; all standard errors are very small and not reported. Second, while annual labor income is well measured, 15 there may be a concern about the use of annual hours in the construction of our wage rate measure. Annual hours are measured with less precision as they are based on information from the mandatory pension fund ATP, which collects a relatively modest mandatory pension fund payment from all workers in the Danish labor market. The payment depends on the number of hours worked, and so hours may be imputed, but overtime work is not accounted for and hours in part-time jobs are not precisely measured.
This may be particularly problematic in our context where it is obviously of importance to have a precise measure of the change in wage rate associated with passing from one job to another. The measured changes could partly be due to changes in hours worked rather than only to payments per hour. To alleviate this concern we draw on the Wage Statistics Register (WSR or Lønstatistikken), which contains an alternative wage rate per hour reported by employers. This measure accounts explicitly for overtime work and part-time work. The downside of applying this measure is a rather low coverage rate. The 126,400 workplaces in our sample employ in total 1.4 million workers with an observed IDA wage rate, but only 60% of these workers have a reported WSR wage rate.
Our strategy, intended to adjust the IDA wage rate for imprecise measurement of hours, is to estimate a relationship between the two wage variables for the workers with information about both measures. Given the IDA wage rate, we can then impute the overtime and part-time adjusted wage rate for the full sample based on this relationship. In order to obtain a reliable relationship we …rst trim the sample of IDA wages. We drop the top and bottom one percent of the observations, and we also eliminate IDA wage rates that are deemed of low quality by Statistics Denmark. This reduces the number of observations to 54% of the original sample of workers. The WSR wage rate and the IDA wage rate are highly correlated with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.87. The next step is to estimate the relationship between the two measures. We use fractional polynomial regression, which is a very ‡exible way to estimate a relationship between two variables. 16 This yields the following relationship E(w W SR jw IDA ) = 215:7 + 37:9 w IDA 100 Using this functional form, Figure 5 plots the predicted adjusted wage rate against the IDA wage and also contains a 45 -line. The predicted wage rate is lower than than the IDA wage rate in most of the wage distribution, which is consistent with the existence of overtime work. At the bottom of the distribution the predicted wage rate is larger than the IDA wage rate, which is consistent with the WSR data better capturing part-time work. 1 5 Annual labor income is based on tax return data. The Danish Tax Agency obtains third-party information from employers on nearly all labor income in Denmark, and tax evasion on labor income is almost zero (Kleven et al., 2011) . 1 6 We use the FRACPOLY routine in Stata. The …nal step in this robustness exercise is to replace the IDA wage rate with the predicted wage rate for all workers in the sample, calculate the average workplace wage rate, then estimate the model using this data set, and afterwards estimate once more the elasticity of taxable income.
The full exercise is meant to eliminate hidden hours e¤ects at job shifts and be left as closely as possible with a pure productivity e¤ect on the hourly wage rate. Table 5 , …rst column shows that neither the estimates of structural parameters, nor the implied elasticity change to any substantial degree with this alternative speci…cation. Third, a concern may be that entry-exit behavior of students, going in and out of the labor market and into part-time jobs, and of the oldest group of workers, where job exit to retirement is 21 common, could be important for the results. We have therefore redone the analysis on restricted samples where students and individuals older than 50 are removed from the sample. Columns 3 and 4 report the results from these two sensitivity tests. The main conclusion is that the elasticity estimates of 0.27 and 0.33 are rather close to the baseline estimate of 0.30. We have also tried to remove workers with less than 1 year of work experience. This gives an elasticity equal to 0.35. Fifth, we consider two alternative values of the cuto¤ wage rate w 1 , DKK 80 and DKK 100.
In each alternative case, w 0 is adjusted to preserve w 0 = (1 m 0 ) w 1 , and the P -distribution is reestimated on the relevant domain. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 reveal only small di¤erences in the parameters and the estimates of the elasticity of taxable income " lie in the narrow interval etc. This means that the di¤erence in net income between any two positions i and j is unchanged from the baseline estimation and hence the estimates of the structural parameters and the rate of non-employment as well as the elasticity of taxable income are also unchanged. The e¢ ciency e¤ect is a¤ected, however, since now a decrease of marginal tax rates will cause a larger behavioral increase in tax revenue, because T 1 T 0 has increased, so there is a larger behavioral tax gain as non-employment is reduced. Column 8 of Table 5 shows that the estimate of the marginal excess burden (and therefore the degree of self …nancing) goes up to 97 percent, so in this case the considered tax experiment is close to a "La¤er change".
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we apply a microeconometric, structural analysis to measure the distortionary e¤ects of taxation on labor mobility and the long run allocation of labor. The analysis points to nonnegligible e¤ects of taxes on labor mobility. We estimate a mobility-based elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate in the range 0.15-0.35. This is of the same magnitude as the estimates found in the empirical public …nance literature using di¤erence-in-di¤erence type methods (Saez et al., 2012 ) and bunching at kink-points in the tax schedule (Chetty et al., 2011a) to measure the elasticity of taxable income. The aim of these methods is to capture all relevant behavioral responses to taxation, thereby obtaining a su¢ cient statistic for evaluating the e¢ ciency e¤ects of taxation. However, the methods do not provide a clear identi…cation of the e¤ects of taxation on labor mobility.
We have applied a workhorse, structural model of search and labor mobility for our analysis of the distortionary e¤ects of taxation on the mobility of labor. The analysis relies on many strong, simplifying assumptions, as is common when working with structural models. For example, the empirical identi…cation relies on independence of …rm and worker components in wages and an exogenous distribution of job opportunities, and exploits only cross-sectional variation across individuals for identi…cation.
The model focuses entirely on involuntary job losses leading to unemployment and voluntary job-to-job shifts involving upwards wage mobility. In reality labor market mobility is a complex phenomenon involving changes in geographical location and selling-buying houses, and workers may voluntarily move to a lower-paid job because of other characteristics of the job or the situation of the worker. Also, our analysis does not account for higher e¤ort leading to promotions within …rms, which may also lead to discrete jumps in earnings.
The most heroic assumption of the model is probably that all workers are assumed to be identical, implying that the underlying wage distribution is identical for all individuals. This is in stark contrast to the labor-leisure framework, underlying the standard identi…cation methods used to estimate the elasticity of taxable income, where all variation in wages across individuals is assumed to be fully determined by underlying di¤erences in ability levels, i.e., all workers with the same ability level will receive the exact same wage. Moreover, in that setting, a little more e¤ort of the individual will always result in a little more wage income, rather than in a higher chance of receiving a discrete increase in wage income. Such discrete wage changes, normally observed in job shifts, are not well identi…ed by the standard methods applied in the large empirical public …nance literature. Thus, although our results rely on a number of strong assumptions, they do indicate, in our view, that the empirical public …nance literature may be overlooking sizable labor mobility e¤ects when measuring the behavioral responses to taxation and the elasticity of taxable income.
A Derivation of equations (6) and (7) The derivation proceeds in three steps. In Step 1 we use equation (5) to derive expressions for g 1 ; :::; g N , which are useful for computing the derivatives @g j =@g i appearing in the …rst order conditions (3). In
Step 2 we compute @u=@s 0 from (4) and @g j =@g i from the expressions for g j obtained in
Step 1. Finally, in
Step 3, we insert the expressions for @u=@s 0 and @g j =@g i of Step 2 into the …rst order conditions (2) and (3), and arrive at (6) and (7).
A.1 Step 1
We …rst show that equation (5) implies
; and (A-1)
for i = 2; :::; N . From equation (5), we have
This may be written as
which is equation (A-1). From equation (5), we get
and for i 2, we have
By subtracting the second from the …rst of the two expressions above and splitting up summations, we obtain for i 2: 
This is a recursive solution for g i , i = 2; :::; N depending on s 1 ; :::; s i and g 1 ; :::; g i 1 . We derive a solution for g i+1 only as a function of g i and s i and s i+1 . By leading (A-3), we get
From (A-3), we have
which inserted in g i+1 gives
which gives
By expanding this relationship, we obtain
where we have used (A-1). By expanding further, we get
which is (A-2).
A.2 Step 2
Here, we derive @u=@s 0 and @g j =@s i . Di¤erentiation of equation (4) gives
We show below that di¤erentiation of equations (A-1) and (A-2) give
We start by changing indices in (A-2). This gives
We see directly that @g j =@s i = 0 for j < i.
By di¤erentiating (A-7) with respect to s i for j = i, we get
We now di¤erentiate (A-7) with respect to s i for j > i. For i = 1, we have
This formula also holds for i = 1, which is easily seen by comparing the second equality to the previous expression for @g j =@s 1 .
A. 3 Step 3
Consider optimal search e¤ort at i = N . In this case, the condition (3) becomes
26 From equation (A-6), we have @g N =@s N = 0, because P N = 1. Hence, c 0 (s N ) = 0 giving s N = 0 in (6).
Next, we derive (7). We …rst consider i 1. Note that in equation (3) one can let the summation start in i since from equation (A-6), @g j =@s i = 0 for j < i. By isolating c 0 (s i ) from (3), we then obtain
By inserting the derivatives @g j =@s i from (A-6), we get
By leading equation (A-8), we obtain
By substituting (A-10) into (A-9) and multiplying by [ + (1 P i ) s i ] = , we get
From equation (A-4), we have
By substituting this relationship into the above expression, we get This shows that (A-11) also holds for i = 0 with P 0 = 0.
From (A-11) follows by multiplying on both sides by + s i+1 (1 P i ) etc.
which is (7).
B Derivation of Equation (11) We …rst insert W and R from equations (1) and (10) into the expression (9) for D. We then total di¤erentiate this expression thereby obtaining the change in the dead-weight loss of taxation dD as a functions of the changes in tax liabilities dT i , the induced changes in search e¤ort ds i , and the changes in the distributional parameters du and dg i . By arranging the terms appropriately, dD can be split into three components in a way well-known from the theory of taxation dD = dDj M echanical + dDj Behavior on utility + dDj Behavior on tax revenue ;
is the mechanical e¤ect on R + W , and 
is the e¤ect on tax revenue from behavioral responses. The mechanical e¤ect is obviously zero and from the optimum conditions of the worker, @W=@s i = 0, it follows that the behavioral e¤ect on utility is also zero. Thus,
where we have used that @g i =@s j = 0 for i < j according to equation (A-6). Since g is a probability distribution, we have P N i=1 @gi @sj ds j = 0, which after using @g i =@s j = 0 for i < j C Derivation of Equation (12) For T i = T 0 + m w i , equation (11) Since from (A-6) a change in s j only a¤ects g i for i j, and since changes @g i in g i must ad up to zero over all i, we have which is indeed (C-12).
